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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] The continuing expansion and virtually limitless array of technology
and media available to store electronic information has had an
immeasurable impact on the amount of information large organizations
create and maintain. In many instances, this information continues to be
available long after it has served the originator’s purposes. Yet, such
information is not exempt from discovery in litigation, and attempting to
identify, preserve, collect, review, and produce that information results in
a significant burden on litigants, while the failure to do so can result in
draconian sanctions or adverse publicity.
[2] The existence of all of this information often requires large
organizations to spend millions of dollars attempting to comply with
modern discovery obligations, and ironically, these burdens may be
triggered if an adversary can meet the very low evidentiary threshold that
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notice pleading requires.1 Debate as we may the logic of imposing such
significant burdens based on such a minimal showing, discovery, and
particularly electronic discovery, is here to stay.2 While the burdens
imposed are significant, modern discovery rules (especially the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure as amended in 2006) take into account these
burdens and can be used to shield litigants from sanctions or undue
burdens. To prevent sanctions and avoid other undue burdens, litigants
must show their electronic discovery efforts were reasonable.3 To make
such a showing, large organizations must be prepared to proactively
manage electronic discovery issues through internal organization,
communication, and the implementation of processes and procedures
designed to preserve and produce relevant information.
[3] This article will survey the impact of electronic discovery on large
organizations. It will first describe electronic discovery and the 2006
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the impact of the
amendments on the way large organizations operate. The article will then
review some of the potential solutions to common electronic discovery
problems.

1

See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 535 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); The Big Data Dump, THE
ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 2008, at 65, available at
http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12010377.
2
See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1947); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC,
217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.
506, 512 (2002)); Jones v. Goord, No. 95 Civ. 8026, 2002 WL 1007614, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
May 16, 2002).
The Supreme Court recently reiterated that our “simplified notice
pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary
judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of
unmeritorious claims.” Thus, it is now beyond dispute that ‘[b]road
discovery is a cornerstone of the litigation process contemplated by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.’ The Rules contemplate a minimal
burden to bringing a claim; that claim is then fleshed out through
vigorous and expansive discovery.
Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 311 (quoting Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512).
3
See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f).
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II. ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
[4] “Electronic discovery” or “e-discovery” is a term of art that describes
one particular aspect of the broader litigation discovery process.
Discovery is the “[c]ompulsory disclosure, at a party’s request, of
information that relates to the litigation.”4 Electronic discovery deals with
the subset of that compulsory disclosure that requires the identification,
preservation, collection, review, and production of electronic records and
information “stored in any medium from which information can be
obtained.”5 Indeed, a wide array of records stored on a variety of media
are subject to discovery, including not only traditional electronic sources,
such as computers, but also data stored on items like iPhones and
BlackBerrys, memory sticks, flash drives, data discs, and even Internetbased voicemail.6 Access to all of this information may be helpful to the
truth-seeking function of the courts, but several problematic side effects
result:
enhanced discovery compliance costs, enhanced discovery
burdens, and the need for lawyers and judges to apply the law to highly
technical topics generally beyond the knowledge of laymen.
[5] Because a substantial amount of electronic data is typically stored in
diverse ways, and the information systems that house them are technical
and idiosyncratic, mistakes can happen all too easily, and will often have
far-reaching and unintended effects. These mistakes can occur at any
stage of the electronic discovery process. At the preservation stage, if a
litigation hold is not issued in a timely manner, or if counsel and the
organization are unfamiliar with how records should be stored, relevant
information could be discarded.7 The litigation hold also could be drafted
too narrowly because certain “key players” were not identified, resulting
in the loss of relevant information.8 Even when the hold is properly
issued, without periodic reminders about the hold’s existence or revisions
4

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 498 (8th ed. 2004).
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1).
6
See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes, subdivision (a) (2006 Amendment).
7
See Danis v. USN Commc’ns, Inc., No. 98 C 7482, 2000 WL 1694325, *51 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 23, 2000) (granting motion for sanctions for defendant’s failure to take reasonable
steps to preserve data); see also United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d
21, 26 (D.D.C. 2004) (imposing a monetary sanction of $250,000 on eleven corporate
officers that failed to comply with a document retention policy).
8
See generally Danis, 2000 WL 1694325 at *12-14.
5
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to the hold as the case takes shape, there is an increased risk that relevant
information will not be preserved.9 Data may be lost or corrupted if
appropriate harvesting methods are not followed during the collection
stage.10 During the processing and review stages, lack of planning can
result in additional errors,11 including the inadvertent production of
privileged materials.
[6] Until recently, courts had little rule-based guidance addressing the
problems peculiar to electronic discovery. Initially, a number of private
organizations formed to provide guidance to the bench and bar.12 Then,
after lengthy debate, the Supreme Court approved the 2006 amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which were designed to address
these problems.13 A number of states have followed suit and adopted ediscovery rules, with some following the lead established by the federal
rule amendments, some adopting only portions of the amendments, and
others choosing to take an entirely individualized approach.14
A. THE 2006 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
[7] The 2006 electronic discovery amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are intended to assist courts and litigants in balancing the
need for electronically stored information with the burdens that
accompany obtaining it.15 Rules 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, and 45 of the Federal
9

See generally id. at *17.
See generally id.
11
See Metro. Opera Ass’n, Inc. v. Local 100, 212 F.R.D. 178, 181, 221-22, 230
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding person responsible for document collection was inadequately
instructed).
12
See generally The Sedona Conference, http://www.sedonaconference.org/ (last visited
Mar. 31, 2009); American Bar Association Section of Litigation,
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/issuecenter/issue_ediscovery.html (last visited Mar. 31,
2009); National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/CommitteeSearchResults.aspx?committee=248 (last
visited Mar. 31, 2009).
13
See infra Part II.A.
14
See generally Thomas Y. Allman & Ashish S. Prasad, The Forgotten Cousin: State
Rulemaking and Electronic Discovery, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND RETENTION
GUIDANCE FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL 2007, Oct.-Dec. 2007, at 317. This article will
focus on e-discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
15
See id. at 325-27.
10
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Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in a manner designed to provide
access to relevant information, while reducing the burdens imposed on
producing parties. For example, through the use of the undefined term
“electronically stored information” (ESI), the amendments create an initial
limitation on a party’s obligation to produce relevant information and
data.16 At the initial disclosure stage, a party must provide a “copy of, or a
description by category and location of, all . . . electronically stored
information . . . in [its] possession, custody, or control” that the disclosing
party may use to support its claims or defenses.17 A party, however, need
only initially produce ESI from “reasonably accessible” sources.18 If ESI
is “not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost,” then the
party need not produce it, though the party is still obligated to identify it.19
The non-producing party may move to compel production of information
from sources designated as “not reasonably accessible,” and if it does so,
“the party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information
is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that
showing is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from such
sources if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the
limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”20 To balance the burdens imposed on a

16

FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s notes, subdivision (a) (2006 Amendment)
(“The wide variety of computer systems currently in use, and the rapidity of
technological change, counsel against a limiting or precise definition of electronically
stored information.”).
17
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B).
18
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
19
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes, subdivision (b)(2) (2006 Amendment)
(Identification contemplates that the disclosing party will “provide enough detail to
enable the requesting party to evaluate the burdens and costs of providing the discovery
and the likelihood of finding responsive information on the identified sources.”).
20
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). This Rule states that:
The frequency or extent of the use of the discovery methods
otherwise permitted under these rules and by any local rule shall be
limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some
other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less
expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity
by discovery in the action to obtain the information; or (iii) the burden
or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,
taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy,
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producing party with the adversary’s desire to obtain relevant ESI, the
court can impose conditions on production from a “not reasonably
accessible” source, including shifting the cost burden from the producing
party to the party seeking to obtain the discovery.21
[8] The amendments also require that the parties proactively address
discovery in a collaborative fashion, which is intended to minimize court
involvement and make discovery as self-executing as possible. Under
Rule 26(f), parties are required to meet and develop a plan to address
electronic discovery issues prior to the Rule 16(b) scheduling
conference.22
[9] One of the more controversial aspects of the amendments is the socalled Rule 37(f) “safe harbor.”23 Rule 37 authorizes federal courts to
sanction parties for discovery abuses.24 By recognizing the “distinctive
feature of computer operations, [and] the routine alteration and deletion of
information that attends ordinary use, Rule 37(f) creates an exception to
this authority.” 25 The advisory committee’s notes explain that there are
several “steps essential to computer operation [that] may alter or destroy
information, for reasons that have nothing to do with how that information
might relate to litigation.”26 As a result, the usual operation of computer
systems may cause a party to lose potentially discoverable information,
the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the
action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.
Id.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note, subdivision (b)(2) (2006
Amendment) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 33 and 34 also contemplate that
electronically stored information may be relied upon to answer interrogatories, or to
comply with the document inspection and production requirements. Rule 34 requests
may specify the desired form of ESI production, though such demands are subject to
undue burden and cost limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(B), and Rule 34 contemplates
objections as to the form of production, though the objecting party must specify an
agreeable production format and otherwise produce the documents in a manner that is
reasonably useable.).
22
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
23
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f).
24
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)-(d).
25
FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s notes, subdivision (f) (2006 Amendment).
26
Id.
21
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even if such a loss is not the result of the party’s intentional conduct.27
Consequently, Rule 37(f) provides: “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a
court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to
provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine,
good-faith operation of an electronic information system.”28 This
limitation, however, only applies to so-called “rules-based” sanctions.29
Therefore, the court still retains authority to sanction a party for routine
loss of data pursuant to its inherent authority to control litigation.
B. REALITY MEETS THE NEW RULES: THE NATURE OF DATA AT LARGE
ORGANIZATIONS
[10] Large organizations are dynamic in nature and increasingly operate
through the use of electronic data and information, which, as Rule 34 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure makes clear, may be subject to
disclosure and discovery in litigation.30 Terabytes and terabytes of data
27

Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) (emphasis added). “The good faith requirement of Rule 37(f)
means that a party is not permitted to exploit the routine operation of an information
system to thwart discovery obligations by allowing that operation to continue in order to
destroy specific stored information that it is required to preserve.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37
advisory committee’s notes, subdivision (f) (2006 Amendment).
29
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f).
30
Cf. Ed Sperling, Coping with Data Overload, FORBES, Dec. 29, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/technology/2008/12/28/cio-emc-lewis-tech-ciocx_es_1229emc.html. Sperling writes:
28

Every CIO on the planet is besieged by data. They come in
through the electronic door by way of e-mail, they’re generated by
employees creating business plans and purchase orders, and they
multiply almost exponentially.
The fact that much of these data are paperless should, at least
in theory, make data management much simpler. The reality, however,
is that it’s almost impossible to conceive how much data are produced
by a company in a single day, let alone decades.
And sometimes these data come through in multiple
languages. In large corporations where employees are spread around
the globe and furiously pounding out messages on BlackBerrys, new
data are being generated every second of every day. All of this
information has to be stored somewhere, but the sheer volume coupled
with the complexity of interactions in a company make this a daunting
task even to the best-trained IT professionals.
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and information are generated, serving a purpose, and then forgotten but
never really lost.31 This data and information may exist not only on
employee hard drives, but also in e-rooms and on shared work drives,
flash drives, PDAs, databases, and legacy systems no longer in use.32
Business employees or IT personnel may be the custodians of this data,
yet they may have no substantive knowledge of the data contents. The
difficulty in complying with the 2006 amendments (or their state
counterparts) by identifying, preserving, collecting, and producing all
relevant sources of ESI creates a challenge that is daunting at best and,
without careful planning, ripe for disaster.
[11] The rules do not require perfection, but organizations (and their
lawyers) must be in a position to demonstrate that the efforts made to
comply with discovery demands were reasonable.33 Making reasonable
and good faith efforts to comply with discovery is a theme emphasized
throughout recent rules and cases that analyze whether an organization has
met its discovery obligations. Though somewhat amorphous (out of
necessity, given that courts must apply the standard to a multitude of
different situations and scenarios), organizations can plan ahead by
retaining counsel familiar with electronic discovery requirements.
Electronic discovery counsel can help organizations design policies and
procedures that assist employees to identify, separate, retain, and produce
relevant information. Organizations that take these steps are much less
likely to receive sanctions or draconian discovery orders.
C. DUTIES OF COUNSEL
[12] Large organizations are not in this alone. Rule 26(g)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires an attorney of record to sign all
disclosures certifying that “to the best of the person’s knowledge,
Id.
31
See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, WORKING GROUP ON BEST PRACTICES FOR ELEC.
DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., THE SEDONA GUIDELINES: BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES
& COMMENTARY FOR MANAGING INFORMATION & RECORDS IN THE ELECTRONIC AGE vi
(2005), available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSG9_05.pdf.
32
See generally id.
33
See id. at iv.

8

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XV, Issue 3

information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry . . . [the
disclosure] is complete and correct as of the time it is made . . . .”34 In
effect, Rule 26(g)(1) imposes on counsel a duty to guide, manage, and
supervise her client’s efforts to comply with disclosure obligations.35 Rule
26(g)(1) also requires that counsel certify that discovery objections and
responses are consistent with the Rules, current law, or have a reasonable
argument otherwise.36 With the reality of broad electronic discovery and
the complexities and idiosyncrasies of modern record keeping and
information systems, counsel must become knowledgeable about the ways
her client maintains records and she must also manage the process from
preservation to production so that she can certify compliance. As we will
see, lawyers and organizations alike can be sanctioned for perceived
shortcomings or failures in the discovery process.37
D. QUALCOMM V. BROADCOM: A CAUTIONARY TALE FOR LARGE
ORGANIZATIONS AND COUNSEL
[13] Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.38 provides nine million reasons
why large organizations should proactively confront the electronic
discovery monster head-on. For lawyers, Qualcomm teaches that failure
to appropriately manage the discovery process can be hazardous to one’s
license and reputation. Qualcomm, Inc. (“Qualcomm”) filed suit against
Broadcom Corp. (“Broadcom”), alleging Broadcom infringed on several
patents.39 Broadcom claimed that Qualcomm participated with Broadcom
and others in a “Joint Video Team” (“JVT”) that created the standard by
which Qualcomm’s patented products were designed.40 Consequently,
Broadcom claimed the patents were unenforceable.41

34

FED R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1).
See FED R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes, subdivision (g) (1983 Amendment)
(stating that “Rule 26(g) imposes an affirmative duty to engage in pretrial discovery in a
responsible manner that is consistent with the spirit and purposes of Rules 26 through
37”).
36
FED R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(i).
37
See e.g. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
38
No. 05cv1958-B (BLM), 2008 WL 66932 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008).
39
Id. at *1.
40
Id.
41
Id. at *1, *3.
35

9

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XV, Issue 3

[14] To prove its claims, Broadcom sought discovery related to
Qualcomm’s participation in the JVT.42 Qualcomm denied it was
involved in the JVT during the time period at issue, but nonetheless agreed
to produce responsive non-privileged documents “which [could] be
located after a reasonable search.” 43 Qualcomm also stated that its
investigation was ongoing and that it would supplement responses as
“warranted by its investigation.”44 Yet, after designating two Rule
30(b)(6) corporate witnesses to testify on its behalf (as individuals most
knowledgeable about participation in the JVT)45 Qualcomm and its
counsel failed to search either employee’s computer for relevant
documents.46 During the second employee’s deposition, counsel for
Qualcomm discovered that a Qualcomm employee was on one of the JVT
e-mail distribution lists.47 But the attorney failed to question whether
Qualcomm was involved in the JVT during the relevant time period.
During trial, Qualcomm’s counsel discovered twenty-one emails on a
Qualcomm witness’ computer that were associated with the development
of the standard through the JVT during times wherein Qualcomm claimed
it was not participating.48 After trial, in-house counsel for Qualcomm
admitted that it failed to produce nearly 50,000 relevant documents, many
of which undercut Qualcomm’s representations to the court.49 Magistrate
Judge Barbara Major issued an order that Qualcomm show cause why the
company and nineteen of its attorneys should not be sanctioned for alleged
discovery abuses, including the failure to produce “tens of thousands” of
relevant documents.50 The attorneys were those who “signed discovery
responses, signed pleadings and pretrial motions, and/or appeared at trial
on behalf of Qualcomm.”51
42

Id. at *2.
Id.
44
Id.
45
Rule 30(b)(6) requires an organization named as a deponent to designate individuals to
testify on its behalf, to the extent the organization has set forth which matters the
individual is qualified to testify. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6).
46
Id. at *3. The first witness testified Qualcomm never participated in the JVT, which
was incorrect, so Qualcomm agreed to produce another 30(b)(6) witness. The second
witness testified that Qualcomm began work with the JVT in 2003. Id.
47
Id. n.2.
48
Id. at *4.
49
Id. at *6.
50
Id. at *1.
51
Id.
43
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[15] The court found that, “Qualcomm, its employees, and its witnesses
actively organized and/or participated in a plan to profit heavily by (1)
wrongfully concealing the patents-in-suit while participating in the JVT
and then (2) actively hiding this concealment from the Court, the jury, and
opposing counsel during the present litigation.”52 Judge Major found that
Qualcomm’s “counsel participated in an organized program of litigation
misconduct and concealment throughout discovery, trial, and post-trial
before new counsel took over lead role in the case . . . .”53 The court
explained:
For the current “good faith” discovery system to function in
the electronic age, attorneys and clients must work together
to ensure that both understand how and where electronic
documents, records and emails are maintained and to
determine how best to locate, review, and produce
responsive documents. Attorneys must take responsibility
for ensuring that their clients conduct a comprehensive and
appropriate document search. Producing 1.2 million pages
of marginally relevant documents while hiding 46,000
critically important ones does not constitute good faith and
does not satisfy either the client’s or attorney’s discovery
obligations.
Similarly, agreeing to produce certain
categories of documents and then not producing all of the
documents that fit within such a category is unacceptable.54
[16] The court noted that it had authority to sanction Qualcomm’s
attorneys on the basis of Rule 26(g) and its requirement that an attorney
certify that the objections and responses were made following a reasonable
inquiry, analogizing this requirement with those found in Rule 11.55 The
court then explained that by agreeing to produce all responsive documents
based on a diligent search, Qualcomm gave Broadcom no reason to
believe it was not participating in discovery in good faith.56
Consequently, Broadcom did not file a motion to compel under Rule 37, a
52

Id. at *5.
Id.
54
Id. at *9.
55
Id. at *7.
56
Id. at *8.
53
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prerequisite to the imposition of sanctions under the Rule.57 The court
instead relied on its inherent authority to sanction, explaining:
[R]eview of Qualcomm’s declarations, the attorneys’
declarations, and Judge Brewster’s orders leads this Court
to the inevitable conclusion that Qualcomm intentionally
withheld tens of thousands of decisive documents from its
opponent in an effort to win this case and gain a strategic
business advantage over Broadcom. Qualcomm could not
have achieved this goal without some type of assistance or
deliberate ignorance from its retained attorneys.58
The court found that Qualcomm failed to provide sufficient evidence to
establish that it actually searched for responsive documents during the
time period at issue or that it conducted any searches of the computers or
databases of employees likely to have responsive documents, including
those it identified to serve as its corporate witnesses.59 The court said such
searches were “basic,” and the failure to conduct them was indicative of
Qualcomm’s bad faith, along with the sheer volume of unproduced
documents that directly undercut Qualcomm’s representations.60 In
summary, the court concluded:
Qualcomm had the ability to identify its employees and
consultants who were involved in the JVT, to access and
review their computers, databases and emails, to talk with
the involved employees and to refresh their recollections if
necessary, to ensure that those testifying about the
corporation’s knowledge were sufficiently prepared and
testified accurately, and to produce in good faith all
relevant and requested discovery. . . . Qualcomm chose not
to do so and therefore must be sanctioned.61

57

Id.
Id. at *9.
59
Id. at *10.
60
Id.
61
Id. at *12.
58
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[17] Of the nineteen Qualcomm attorneys ordered to show cause,
the court sanctioned six, referring generally to their failure to
conduct a reasonable inquiry into Qualcomm’s discovery efforts.62
As support for its findings, the court explained:
It is inconceivable that these talented, well-educated, and
experienced lawyers failed to discover through their
interactions with Qualcomm any facts or issues that caused
(or should have caused) them to question the sufficiency of
Qualcomm’s document search and production. Qualcomm
did not fail to produce a document or two; it withheld over
46,000 critical documents that extinguished Qualcomm’s
primary argument of non-participation in the JVT. In
addition, the suppressed documents did not belong to one
employee, or a couple of employees who had since left the
company; they belonged to (or were shared with)
numerous, current Qualcomm employees, several of whom
testified (falsely) at trial and in depositions. Given the
volume and importance of the withheld documents, the
number of involved Qualcomm employees, and the
numerous warning flags, the Court finds it unbelievable
that the retained attorneys did not know or suspect that
Qualcomm had not conducted an adequate search for
documents.63
The court went on to say:
[O]ne or more of the retained lawyers chose not to look in
the correct locations for the correct documents, to accept
the unsubstantiated assurances of an important client that
its search was sufficient, to ignore the warning signs that
the document search and production were inadequate, not
to press Qualcomm employees for the truth, and/or to
encourage employees to provide the information (or lack of
62

Id. at *13-15. The court declined to sanction a number of attorneys, including several
who signed pleadings acting as local counsel, by finding that, based on the totality of the
circumstances, this would be inappropriate. Id. at *16.
63
Id. at *12.
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information) that Qualcomm needed to assert its nonparticipation argument and to succeed in this lawsuit.
These choices enabled Qualcomm to withhold hundreds of
thousands of pages of relevant discovery and to assert
numerous false and misleading arguments to the court and
jury. This conduct warrants the imposition of sanctions.64
The court explained that Rules 26(g) and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure should not be read so narrowly that only the attorney who
signed false discovery responses could be sanctioned.65 To find otherwise
would allow an attorney to rely on “inadequate or misleading” discovery
responses to present “false and unsupported legal arguments.”66 The court
again found sanctions appropriate under its inherent powers.67
[18] The court sanctioned Qualcomm in the amount of $8,568,633.24—
the total sum of Broadcom’s litigation costs and attorneys’ fees.68 This
was justified because “Qualcomm’s failure to produce the massive number
of critical documents at issue in this case significantly increased the scope,
complexity and length of the litigation and justifies a significant monetary
award.”69 The sanctioned attorneys were required to send a copy of the
court’s order to the California State Bar Intake Unit so that their conduct
could be evaluated and, if necessary, sanctioned by the State Bar.70 In
addition, the court required Qualcomm and all sanctioned attorneys to
participate in a “Case Review and Enforcement of Discovery Obligations”
program (CREDO).71 The CREDO required that the sanctioned attorneys
and Qualcomm:
64

Id. at *13.
Id. at n.9.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at *17.
69
Id.
70
Id. at *18. While the court’s order was upheld in these respects, it was vacated in part
because the court found that the self-defense exception to the attorney-client privilege
applied and as a matter of due process, Qualcomm’s lawyers were entitled to rely on
otherwise privileged communications and materials to defend their conduct. See
Qualcomm v. Broadcom, No. 05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108, at *3 (S.D.
Cal. March 5, 2008).
71
Qualcomm Inc., 2008 WL 66932, at *18.
65
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(1) identify the factors that contributed to the discovery violation:
insufficient communication (including between client and retained
counsel, among retained lawyers and law firms, and between junior
lawyers conducting discovery and senior lawyers asserting legal
arguments), inadequate case management (within Qualcomm, between
Qualcomm and the retained lawyers, and by the retained lawyers),
inadequate discovery plans (within Qualcomm and between
Qualcomm and its retained attorneys), etc.;
(2) create and evaluate proposals, procedures, and processes that will
correct the deficiencies identified in subsection (1);
(3) develop and finalize a comprehensive protocol that will prevent
future discovery violations;
(4) apply the protocol developed under subsection (3) to other factual
situations (such as when a client does not have corporate counsel,
when the client has a single in-house lawyer, when the client has a
large legal staff, and when there are two law firms representing one
client);
(5) identify and evaluate methods that corporations can implement to
better enable counsel to identify potential sources of discoverable
documents (e.g. the correct databases, archives, etc.), and
(6) identify any other information or suggestions that will help prevent
discovery violations.72
Qualcomm is an important reminder that courts may have zero tolerance
for discovery mismanagement and that the stakes cannot be higher for
lawyers or their clients.73 The remainder of this article will discuss the
problems that can occur during various stages of the electronic discovery
production process, stressing forward thinking and proactive planning as a
solution, with the assistance of counsel knowledgeable about electronic
discovery.
72
73

Id. at *19.
See id.
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III. PRESERVATION AND COLLECTION
A. IDENTIFYING THE RIGHT CUSTODIANS, DATA, AND INFORMATION
[19] Identifying the right custodians and data can be a difficult task, but it
is the first step of any effort to appropriately tackle electronic discovery.
Large organizations are structured for conducting business, but this does
not necessarily mean that they are structured in a manner that makes
complying with e-discovery obligations easy or even feasible without
substantial planning and oversight by counsel. The primary factor that
contributes to difficulties in electronic discovery is the requirement that
documents be preserved, extracted, and categorized in a manner that is
“unnatural” to the organization. Although difficult, demonstrating a
reasonable good faith effort to preserve and collect the right data is
essential to avoid sanctions.74
[20] For example, in Coleman (Parent) Holdings v. Morgan Stanley &
Co.,75 Coleman (CPH) filed a lawsuit against Morgan Stanley, alleging
fraud in connection with a stock sale.76 An SEC regulation required that
Morgan Stanley maintain certain documents, including e-mail, for two
years, although Morgan Stanley overwrote its e-mails after one year.77
During discovery, the court ordered Morgan Stanley to (1) search its
backup tapes for relevant e-mail; (2) identify e-mails containing certain
words and key phrases; (3) produce all responsive non-privileged e-mails;
(4) provide a privilege log; and (5) certify compliance with the order by
May 14, 2004.78 Although some e-mails were produced as required, the
certification was not executed until more than a month after it was due.79
Once executed, it was also incorrect in its assertion that the production
was complete, and the court found that the declarant, a Morgan Stanley
employee responsible for managing records, knew this to be the case at the
time he executed the declaration.80 In fact, potentially relevant e-mail
74

See id. at *9-12; see also supra text accompanying note 28.
No. 502003CA005045XXOCAI, 2005 WL 679071, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. March 1, 2005).
76
Id. at *1.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at *2.
75
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stored on nearly 2000 back-up tapes at two different storage locations still
needed to go through a complicated restoration process prior to attorney
review and production.81
This process was not completed until
approximately January 2005, with trial scheduled for that February.82
Also, during November 2004, an additional 8000 e-mails were produced,
but according to the court, these were not associated with either of the two
previously identified catalogs of back-up tapes.83
[21] During January and February 2005, additional back-up tapes were
discovered at other facilities on three separate occasions.84 While the
continued production from these sources was ongoing, Morgan Stanley
discovered that an incorrect date range limiter had been used to search the
sources of potentially relevant information identified and produced in May
2004.
This resulted in Morgan Stanley unintentionally omitting
potentially responsive e-mail in the portion of the production that was
timely made.85
[22] In its opinion, the court documented all of these issues, which it
perceived as shortcomings, and relied on them to make the following
findings:
[D]espite MS & Co.’s affirmative duty arising out of the
litigation to produce its e-mails, and contrary to federal law
requiring it to preserve the e-mails, MS & Co. failed to
preserve many e-mails and failed to produce all e-mails
required by the Agreed Order. The failings include
overwriting e-mails after 12 months; failing to conduct
proper searches for tapes that may contain e-mails;
providing a certificate of compliance known to be false
when made and only recently withdrawn; failing to timely
notify CPH when additional tapes were located; failing to
use reasonable efforts to search the newly discovered tapes;
failing to timely process and search data held in the staging
81

Id.
Id.
83
Id. at *3.
84
Id. at *4.
85
Id.
82
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area or notify CPH of the deficiency; failing to write
software scripts consistent with the Agreed Order; and
discovering the deficiencies only after CPH was given the
opportunity to check MS & Co.’s work and the MS & Co.’s
attorneys were required to certify the completeness of the
prior searches.
Many of these failings were done
knowingly, deliberately, and in bad faith.86
The court said it was clear that Morgan Stanley had intended to “thwart”
discovery, and as a sanction, shifted the burden of proof for CPH’s fraud
claim to Morgan Stanley.87 The court further sanctioned Morgan Stanley
by requiring that it pay for CPH’s costs in bringing the motion, agree to
read a conclusive statement of facts detailing the discovery problems in
the case, and allow CPH to argue any inferences that could be drawn from
the facts, including that Morgan Stanley’s “concealment” could be relied
upon to support a punitive damages claim.88
[23] Morgan Stanley provides an extreme example of the problems large
organizations can face for failing to identify sources of potentially relevant
data. Problems identifying relevant data are avoidable, but require upfront planning and substantial involvement and oversight by counsel.
Organizations should strive to retain counsel familiar with electronic
discovery requirements and allow counsel to become familiar with the
organization and its operations. Once litigation is reasonably anticipated
(and throughout litigation), it is important for the client and discovery
counsel to understand as much as possible about the facts of a case so that
appropriate steps can be taken to preserve relevant documents. Prior to
litigation, counsel and the client should consider working together to map
the organization’s information systems and technology infrastructure;
doing so enables the organization to combine this information with the
facts of the case to identify sources of potentially relevant data.

86

Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
88
Id. at *7-8.
87
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B. PRESERVING AND COLLECTING DATA AND INFORMATION: THE
ZUBULAKE CASES
[24] Identifying data is only the first step. Once relevant data are
identified, they must be preserved. Accordingly, it is also essential that
counsel and the client become familiar with the manner in which records
are stored, and the retention period for those records, especially back-up
tapes,89 so that counsel and the client can issue an appropriate order or
“litigation hold” to prevent inadvertently discarding potentially relevant
information.90 Failure to properly preserve data was at the core of one of
the most notable e-discovery cases, Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC
(Zubulake I).91
[25] In Zubulake I, Laura Zubulake sued her former employer UBS for
gender discrimination, and sought to prove her case by discovering e-mail
and other information that existed in UBS’s active electronic files and
archived back-up media.92 The question posed was “[t]o what extent is
inaccessible electronic data discoverable, and who should pay for its
production?”93 The court poignantly observed “[t]he more information
there is to discover, the more expensive it is to discover all the relevant
information until, in the end, ‘discovery is not just about uncovering the

89

Preservation of back-up tapes can often be costly and may not be necessary.
See supra note 7.
91
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
92
Id. at 312-13. The Zubulake cases are famous in the e-discovery world; they are a
series of five opinions written by Judge Shira Scheinlin prior to the amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Four of the Zubulake opinions – Zubulake I, III, IV,
and V – highlight some of the problems organizations and counsel can face in identifying
and preserving relevant information and offer sound guidance as to the appropriate
manner for resolving the peculiar problems raised by e-discovery. In particular, the cases
explore and endeavor to answer the questions of when a court should shift the costs and
burdens of e-discovery between litigants, under what circumstances and when electronic
data must be preserved, how an organization should go about such preservation efforts,
and the duties of organizations and counsel to participate in the discovery process. See
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake
III), 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV),
220 F.R.D. 212, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V),
229 F.R.D. 422, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
93
Id. at 311.
90
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truth, but also about how much of the truth the parties can afford to
disinter.’”94
[26] Zubulake wanted e-mail stored on UBS’s back-up tapes, which
would be costly to restore.95 To resolve the parties’ dispute, the court
began by describing its authority to shift the cost burden associated with
discovery.96 Foreshadowing the eventual distinction made by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the court explained that often discovery of
electronic information will be unduly burdensome based on whether the
data is stored “in an accessible or inaccessible format.”97 The court
ordered UBS to produce, at its expense, all responsive e-mails existing in
an accessible format (i.e., in a format that could be readily accessed with
minimal burden).98 The court ordered further sampling from the back-up
tapes that stored e-mail, and an affidavit providing the sampling results,
along with the costs of restoration, so that it could then rule on whether
cost-shifting was appropriate.99
[27] Zubulake III addressed the merits of UBS’s cost-shifting request.100
The court engaged in a multi-factor analysis to determine that some costshifting was appropriate, but determined that only the cost of restoration
and searching are appropriately shifted to any degree.101 A producing
party “should always bear the cost of reviewing and producing”
responsive documents, even if retrieved from an inaccessible source,
because the reviewing party has the sole power to design the review
protocol and control costs.102
[28] After the restoration and search process was complete, the parties
found themselves back in front of the court for Zubulake IV. UBS had
failed to preserve certain back-up tapes and e-mails had been deleted from
94

Id.
Id. at 312-13.
96
Id. at 315-16.
97
Id. at 318 (emphasis omitted).
98
See id. at 324.
99
Id.
100
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Zubulake II did not address e-discovery issues.
101
Id. at 289-90.
102
Id. at 290 (emphasis in original).
95
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UBS’s active systems after counsel issued a litigation hold directing
employees to preserve all documents related to the Zubulake litigation.103
Zubulake sought sanctions, requesting the reallocation of the restoration
costs to UBS and reimbursement for the costs to re-depose certain
witnesses, as well as an adverse inference instruction to the jury.104
[29] The court observed that the failure to preserve electronically stored
information is a spoliation issue, and found authority to sanction litigants
for the spoliation of evidence under its inherent authority and the Federal
Rules.105 The key question was the scope of UBS’s duty to preserve the email, which required inquiry into when the duty arose and then, to the
extent such a duty existed, the outer parameters of that duty.106 The court
explained that the duty arises when “litigation [is] reasonably
anticipated.”107 Although Zubulake filed an EEOC charge in August
2001, the court found that UBS reasonably anticipated litigation before
that time, explaining:
Merely because one or two employees contemplate the
possibility that a fellow employee might sue does not
generally impose a firm-wide duty to preserve. But in this
case, it appears that almost everyone associated with
Zubulake recognized the possibility that she might sue. For
example, an e-mail authored by Zubulake’s co-worker
Vinnay Datta, concerning Zubulake and labeled “UBS
attorney client priviladge [sic],” was distributed to Chapin
(Zubulake’s supervisor), Holland and Leland Tomblick
(Chapin's supervisor), Vail (Zubulake’s former supervisor),
and Andrew Clarke (Zubulake’s co-worker) in late April
2001. That e-mail, replying to one from Hardisty,
essentially called for Zubulake’s termination: “Our biggest
strength as a firm and as a desk is our ability to share
103

Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id.
105
Id. at 216. “Spoliation is ‘the destruction of or significant alteration of evidence, or
the failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably
foreseeable litigation.’” Id. (quoting West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d
776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999)).
106
Id.
107
Id. at 217.
104
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information and relationships. Any person who threatens
this in any way should be firmly dealt with . . . . [B]elieve
me that a lot of other [similar] instances have occurred
earlier.”108
[30] The court then addressed the breadth of UBS’s preservation
obligations, explaining that it is completely unnecessary for a company to
“preserve every shred of paper, every e-mail or electronic document, and
every backup tape,” recognizing that such a draconian requirement would
“cripple large corporations . . . that are almost always involved in
litigation.”109 The court explained that the “duty should certainly extend
to any documents or tangible things . . . made by individuals ‘likely to
have discoverable information that the disclosing party may use to support
its claims or defenses,’” including documents prepared for those persons
and information that is “‘relevant to the subject matter of the action.’”110
As shorthand for describing the breadth of a litigant’s preservation duty,
the court coined the phrase “key players” to describe those individuals
who are likely to have, or know where to obtain, information relevant to
the litigation.111
[31] Summarizing a litigant’s preservation obligations, the court said:
The scope of a party’s preservation obligation can
be described as follows: Once a party reasonably
anticipates litigation, it must suspend its routine document
retention/destruction policy and put in place a “litigation
hold” to ensure the preservation of relevant documents. As
a general rule, that litigation hold does not apply to
inaccessible backup tapes (e.g., those typically maintained
solely for the purpose of disaster recovery), which may
continue to be recycled on the schedule set forth in the
company’s policy. On the other hand, if backup tapes are
accessible (i.e., actively used for information retrieval),

108

Id. (alterations in original) (footnote omitted).
Id.
110
Id. at 217-18 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A), (b)(1)).
111
Id. at 218.
109
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then such tapes would likely be subject to the litigation
hold.
However, it does make sense to create one
exception to this general rule. If a company can identify
where particular employee documents are stored on backup
tapes, then the tapes storing the documents of “key players”
to the existing or threatened litigation should be preserved
if the information contained on those tapes is not otherwise
available. This exception applies to all backup tapes.112
Applying these standards to the motion for sanctions, the court explained
that UBS had a duty to preserve the back-up tapes at issue, but because
Zubulake could not demonstrate that the information contained on the
back-up tapes would have supported her claims, an adverse inference
instruction was not warranted.113 The court required UBS to pay the costs
for Zubulake to re-depose certain witnesses on the issues surrounding the
destruction of relevant e-mails.114
[32] During these depositions, Zubulake discovered that additional
potentially relevant e-mails were intentionally deleted, despite the
existence of a litigation hold instructing that they be retained, and other email had not yet been collected from an employee; consequently, neither
had been produced.115 Zubulake again requested that the court sanction
UBS, and the court took up the issue in Zubulake V.116 Zubulake V
explained a party’s duty to heed counsel’s advice to preserve potentially
relevant documents and discussed in detail counsel’s key role as an active
participant in, and supervisor of, a party’s discovery compliance efforts.117
Acknowledging that litigants often issue a “litigation hold” to instruct
custodians that certain information and data needed for litigation must not
be discarded, the court explained that preservation duties go further: “[a]
112

Id. The duty to preserve, however, does not require that a party retain “multiple
identical copies” of documents, which means that a party need not preserve backup tapes
if the data can be obtained from other, less burdensome sources.
113
Id. at 219-22.
114
Id. at 222. The court noted that it had already considered the loss of certain e-mail in
its original cost-shifting order, so further cost-shifting was not appropriate.
115
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
116
Id. at 424.
117
Id. at 431-36.
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party’s discovery obligations do not end with the implementation of a
‘litigation hold’—to the contrary, that’s only the beginning. Counsel must
oversee compliance with the litigation hold, monitoring the party’s efforts
to retain and produce the relevant documents.”118 The court explained that
“counsel and client must take some reasonable steps” to identify relevant
sources of information and that counsel has an affirmative duty to locate
relevant information, requiring that counsel “become fully familiar with
her client’s document [and] data retention architecture” by communicating
with key players and information technology personnel.119
After
identifying and preserving sources of potentially relevant information,
there is an ongoing duty to ensure continued compliance with the
preservation directive.120 The court explains that this may involve
periodically communicating directly with key players and assisting the
client to put procedures in place to segregate and preserve relevant backup media.121
[33] The court found that UBS’s counsel failed to appropriately
communicate the litigation hold, interview key players, and that UBS
failed to heed counsel’s warnings and preserve relevant e-mails.122 In
addition, the court found that the failure to preserve was willful and that an
adverse inference instruction was appropriate.123 The court also required
that UBS pay the costs associated with re-deposing witnesses in light of
the tardy production of e-mails, along with the costs of the motion.124
[34] Zubulake IV and V create a roadmap for large organizations wrestling
with electronic discovery obligations. A large organization that is willing
to work with counsel to proactively implement plans and procedures that
help ensure the timely and continued preservation of ESI will have little
difficulty showing that its efforts were reasonable. In contrast, taking an
ad hoc approach to electronic discovery not only increases the risk that

118

Id. at 432.
Id. (emphasis in original).
120
Id. at 433.
121
Id. at 433-34.
122
Id. at 436.
123
Id. at 436-37.
124
Id. at 437.
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relevant data and information will be discarded, but virtually guarantees a
finding that the organization’s efforts were not reasonable.
[35] If the information is never collected when needed, it will not matter
that the information was preserved. Zubulake V touched on the potential
ramifications of such a situation; when a key player complies with the
litigation hold, but counsel fails to collect her documents, the ultimate
result is the late production of responsive e-mail(s).125 Tardy production
can certainly cause problems, as it did for UBS, but it could have been
worse. Failing to collect the information could result in it never being
discovered and produced, which opens the door for an adversary to argue
that such information was intentionally “hidden.”
[36] Collection problems also go far beyond merely neglecting to ask for
responsive information. The technical nature of electronic media, and the
special software that may be necessary to appropriately “harvest” the
preserved data or information, can cause a myriad of problems that result
in loss or corruption of the data as it actually exists in the organization’s
files.126 At best, this might mean an invasive exploration of confidential
and proprietary files by an adversary’s expert to confirm that the data
produced was not altered.127 At worst, an organization may be faced with
a finding that the evidence was spoliated by the process.128
[37] Given the risks, an organization’s plans to address discovery should
include identifying and selecting appropriate ESI vendors. An ESI vendor
can provide various services, including data collection, processing, data
hosting, and production.129 Some vendors provide all of these services,
which can be desirable for a variety of reasons, including reduced pricing
and better quality.130

125

See id. at 424.
See Ashish Prasad et. al., Best Practices for Document Review in Litigation and
Government Investigations 2008, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY GUIDANCE 2008: WHAT
CORPORATE AND OUTSIDE COUNSEL NEED TO KNOW, Oct. 29, 2008, at 165, 167-68.
127
See id. at 168-70.
128
Cf. id. (discussing the consequences of errors in document review).
129
Id. at 170-72.
130
Id. at 172.
126
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C. THE VALUE OF PRIVILEGE WHEN FACING SANCTIONS
[38] No matter how prepared an organization is, it will inevitably face
accusations that its electronic discovery efforts were below par. To show
such claims are baseless, it will often be necessary to rely on information
that the organization deems privileged. For example, when a law firm or
general counsel’s office issues to company employees a “litigation hold”
or other notice informing the constituents of ongoing litigation and the
need to preserve relevant documents, courts have recognized such
communications fall within the scope of the attorney-client privilege.131
Appropriate preservation notices or “litigation holds” that suspend an
organization’s usual records retention schedule are very helpful
documents. Litigants should consider that revelation of the contents of the
communication, in the right circumstances, may help demonstrate that the
organization’s discovery compliance efforts were reasonable. It may not
even be necessary to reveal the contents of the communication beyond the
court. Litigants should first seek to submit such information to the court
for in camera inspection. This should preserve the privilege while
providing the court with information it needs to find that the steps taken
were reasonable.132
IV. DOCUMENT REVIEW
A. IDENTIFYING RELEVANT DOCUMENTS AND WITHHOLDING PRIVILEGED
DOCUMENTS
[39] Counsel walks a razor’s edge in the document review realm,
ensuring that a client’s production is broad enough to encompass all
131

See Muro v. Target Corp., 250 F.R.D. 350, 360 (N.D. Ill. 2007); see also Ford Motor
Co. v. Hall-Edwards, No. 3D08-2447, 2008 WL 5070290, at *6 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. Dec. 3,
2008) (“We conclude that the Ford suspension orders were created by Ford’s attorneys in
anticipation of litigation and thus constitute work product. Moreover, because revealing
the documents identified by Ford’s counsel as those that need to be kept in anticipation of
litigation would reveal the mental impressions of counsel, suspension orders fall within
the absolute immunity protecting opinion work product. . . . Further, the suspension
orders constituted legal advice given by Ford’s Office of the General Counsel to its client
concerning the scope of documents which should be retained for purposes of pending or
anticipated litigation. Thus, they are protected under the attorney-client privilege.”)
132
See, e.g., Muro, 250 F.R.D. at 360.
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responsive documents (and “responsiveness” is often subjective), while
narrow enough to not unnecessarily expose confidential or otherwise
privileged client information to the opposing party or the public. In
addition, document review accounts for a substantial amount of litigation
costs—some claim upwards of 90%.133 Often a client, understandably
looking to reduce costs, will hire contract attorneys and other vendors to
accomplish the review task.
[40] Experts in this field agree that, like so many other aspects of ediscovery, investing in creating a careful plan and assembling the right
team can make the process manageable and produce a defensible and more
accurate review product.134 The importance of having a well-considered
plan becomes all the more important when one considers that document
reviews rely heavily on the most junior attorneys. Breaking the process
into stages that allow for proper information gathering, communication
with opposing counsel, selecting appropriate review tools and vendors,
appropriate review team training, and quality control all assist in the
timely and accurate completion of the document review process.135
B. USE OF ADVANCED SEARCH AND REVIEW METHODS: DISCOVERY
EXPERTS?
[41] Changes are on the horizon in the area of electronic discovery. With
increasingly more advanced methods of searching the gigabytes or
terabytes of data needed for litigation becoming available, large
organizations and counsel may find themselves looking for experts to
validate their efforts. Two opinions recently issued by Judge John M.
Facciola illustrate the emphasis that courts are placing on the document
search and review process.136 Taken together, the opinions envision that
litigants will need to fulfill the requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence to challenge and defend their document search and
133

Dario Olivas & Michael Dolan, Legal Process Outsourcing of First Level Document
Review, http://www.sourcingmag.com/content/c060918a.asp (last visited Mar. 31, 2009).
134
See generally Ashish S. Prasad et al., Cutting to the “Document Review” Chase, BUS.
L. TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 2008, at 57 (2008), http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/2008-1112/prasad.shtml.
135
See id. at 57-60.
136
Equity Analytics LLC v. Lundin, 248 F.R.D. 331 (D.D.C. 2008); United States v.
O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2008).
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review practices.137 These opinions underscore the necessity of having a
proactive plan in place to handle discovery, and competent counsel to
supervise and implement the plan, so that an expert can later opine that the
search methods utilized would yield the intended results.
1. UNITED STATES V. O’KEEFE138
[42] In O’Keefe, the United States was ordered to search its files and
produce documents associated with expedited visa applications.139 The
government used keywords to identify potentially responsive documents
and provided the court with an affidavit detailing the key words relied
upon.140 Judge Facciola explained “[w]hether search terms or ‘keywords’
will yield the information sought is a complicated question involving the
interplay, at least, of the sciences of computer technology, statistics and
linguistics,” and that keyword searching, at least for the purpose of
complying with discovery obligations, is “clearly beyond the ken of
laymen [including lawyers and judges].” 141 The party challenging the
sufficiency of such a search, however, has the burden of showing that it
was insufficient, and Judge Facciola said such challenges must be

137

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case.

FED. R. EVID. 702; see also O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14; Equity Analytics, 248 F.R.D.
331 (applying Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to document search and
review).
138
537 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2008).
139
O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at *15. Even though O’Keefe was a criminal matter, Judge
Facciola relied extensively on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to interpret the
government’s document review obligations. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d at *18-23.
140
Id. at *16-18.
141
Id. at *24 (citing George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the
Legal System Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10 (2007)).
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bolstered by evidence that complies with the requirements of Federal Rule
of Evidence 702.142
2. EQUITY ANALYTICS V. LUNDIN143
[43] Equity Analytics, another Judge Facciola opinion, was issued less
than a month after O’Keefe.144 The lawsuit was based on Equity
Analytics’ allegations that Lundin, a former employee, illegally accessed
its computer systems after he was terminated.145 The parties agreed that a
search of Lundin’s personal computer (which he was using for personal
matters and his new work) would need to be conducted, but they disagreed
as to how that search should be accomplished.146 Predictably, Equity
Analytics (Equity) wanted an expansive forensic search of Lundin’s
personal computer, citing a change in operating systems as potentially
corrupting files and preventing the discovery of relevant information,
while Lundin preferred a search restricted to certain keywords and files,
citing the substantial amount of irrelevant and confidential personal
information contained on his computer.147
[44] Judge Facciola said:
[L]awyers express as facts what are actually highly
debatable propositions as to the efficacy of various methods
used to search electronically stored information. . . .
[D]etermining whether a particular search
methodology, such as keywords, will or will not be
effective certainly requires knowledge beyond the ken of a
lay person (and a lay lawyer) and requires expert testimony
that meets the requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
Obviously, determining the
significance of the loading of a new operating system upon
file structure and retention and why the contemplated
forensic search will yield information that will not be
142

Id. at *24.
248 F.R.D. 331 (D.D.C. 2008).
144
Equity Analytics, 248 F.R.D. 331; O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14.
145
Equity Analytics, 248 F.R.D. at 332.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 332-33.
143
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yielded by a search limited by file types or keywords are
beyond any experience or knowledge I can claim.
Accordingly, I am going to require Equity to submit
an affidavit from its examiner explaining why the
limitations proposed by plaintiff are unlikely to capture all
the information Equity seeks and the impact, if any, of the
loading of the new operating system upon Lundin’s
computer and the data that was on it before the new
operating system was loaded. The expert shall also
describe in detail how the search will be conducted. Armed
with that information, supplemented if necessary by a
hearing at which the expert will be cross examined, I can
make the best possible judgment as to how to balance
Equity’s need for information against Lundin’s privacy.148
[45] The expert was to make a “mirror image” of the hard drive, which
would presumably preserve Lundin’s computer in its current state, but
Equity, concerned that the mirror image would not be exact, wanted the
computer that Lundin needed to make a living preserved until the
conclusion of the litigation, effectively depriving Lundin of its use. Judge
Facciola again deferred to the expert to determine whether the mirror
images would be “perfect copies” of Lundin’s hard drives.149
[46] Given the prevalence of Google, Yahoo, and other search engines,
we take it for granted that we can rely on keyword searching as a tool
without needing to resort to an expert to make sure we identified the
information desired. Lawyers have been using keywords to search
Westlaw and Lexis for years. Yet Judge Facciola’s point in O’Keefe is
well taken. We know from personal experience that not all searches are
equally effective. While we can become journeymen, or even search
experts, if we often use the same search tool to look for the same types of
information, the skills required are a combination of understanding the
technology we are using and the linguistics necessary to identify the
desired information. Considering this, before large organizations and
lawyers represent to courts that they have conducted a reasonable search,
they should consider whether they should identify someone who can be
148
149

Id. at 333.
Id. at 333-34.
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qualified as an expert under Rule 702 to conduct or supervise the search.
If challenged, the “search expert” will be in a position to opine that the
search was reasonable and identified the desired relevant documents.150
[47] Keyword searching is literally the tip of the iceberg when it comes to
separating the relevant from non-relevant in document review. Advanced
forms of technology are being explored that are intended to reduce costs
while enhancing accuracy.151 While in its infancy, such methods show
great promise. Large organizations that rely on such methods, however,
will need to be prepared to show, likely through an expert, that the search
method was successful in identifying relevant information.
V. PRODUCTION
A. FORM OF PRODUCTION
[48] With the variety of media types in existence, the available methods
of production have also grown. It is no longer necessary to produce
multiple bankers boxes filled with hard copy documents; the same volume
can often be captured on a single DVD or computer hard drive. But with
the variety of production options comes a new problem: often the selected
method of production will not be acceptable to the opposing party, perhaps
because the party does not have the required software to view the
documents or, as is becoming increasingly common, it prefers the “native”
version of the document, as opposed to an imaged .pdf or .tiff copy.152
150

It will also be necessary to document the steps taken to conduct the search.
For example, the company H5 claims that, through the use of advanced technology
and experts, it can reduce document review costs and inaccuracy by fifty percent. See H5
Company Approach, http://www.h5.com/services/approach.html (last visited Mar. 31,
2009).
152
“Native format” is defined as follows:
151

Electronic documents have an associated file structure defined by the
original creating application. This file structure is referred to as the
“native format” of the document. Because viewing or searching
documents in the native format may require the original application (for
example, viewing a Microsoft Word document may require the
Microsoft Word application), documents may be converted to a neutral
format as part of the record acquisition or archive process. “Static”
formats (often called “imaged formats”), such as TIFF or PDF, are
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[49] The court in Aguilar v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Division153 underscored the solution to this problem, which is to address
ESI production early:
This lawsuit demonstrates why it is so important that
parties fully discuss their ESI early in the evolution of a
case. Had that been done, the Defendants might not have
opposed the Plaintiffs’ requests for certain metadata.
Moreover, the parties might have been able to work out
many, if not all, of their differences without court
involvement or additional expense, thereby furthering the
“just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of this case.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Instead, these proceedings have now
been bogged down in expensive and time-consuming
litigation of electronic discovery issues only tangentially
related to the underlying merits of the Plaintiffs’ Bivens
claims. Hopefully, as counsel in future cases become more
knowledgeable about ESI issues, the frequency of such
skirmishes will diminish.154
[50] In Aguilar, the parties failed to address the document production
format during the Rule 26(f) conference and when plaintiff’s discovery
requests likewise failed to specify a desired production format.155 After
designed to retain an image of the document as it would look viewed in
the original creating application but do not allow metadata to be viewed
or the document information to be manipulated. In the conversion to
static format, the metadata can be processed, preserved and
electronically associated with the static format file. However, with
technology advancements, tools and applications are becoming
increasingly available to allow viewing and searching of documents in
their native format, while still preserving all metadata.
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, WORKING GROUP OF ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD.,
THE SEDONA GLOSSARY: E-DISCOVERY & DIGITAL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 37 (2d
ed. 2007), available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did=TSCGlossary_12_07.pdf.
153
Aguilar v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Div. of U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., No. 07 Civ. 8224(JGK)(FM), 2008 WL 5062700 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2008).
154
Id. at *14.
155
Id. at *2.

32

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XV, Issue 3

defendants had nearly completed processing the documents, plaintiff
demanded that certain documents be produced in a “native” format, while
others be produced with the corresponding metadata for each file.156
Aguilar is but one example of why it is so important for large
organizations and counsel to discuss the production format up-front, which
will help avoid a waste of time and resources.
B. PRIVILEGE CONCERNS
[51]
Because the amount of available relevant data has grown
exponentially, it has become increasingly difficult to prevent the
inadvertent production of privileged information. Recently, the Federal
Rules of Evidence were amended to address this problem.
1. RULE 502 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
[52] On September 19, 2008, Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
was enacted.157 The Rule applies to all federal cases filed after its
enactment and in any pending proceeding whenever “just and
practicable.”158 It also operates to prevent arguments of waiver in state
court proceedings, to the extent disclosure is made in a federal proceeding.
In Rule 502(a), the Rule first addresses so-called “subject matter waiver,”
which extends waiver of the attorney-client privilege beyond the actual
document produced to anything dealing with the “subject matter” of the
communication actually disclosed.159 In attempting to limit the damage to
156

Id.
Metadata, frequently referred to as “data about data,” is electronicallystored evidence that describes the “history, tracking, or management of
an electronic document.” It includes the “hidden text, formatting
codes, formulae, and other information associated” with an electronic
document. . . . Although metadata often is lumped into one generic
category, there are at least several distinct types, including substantive
(or application) metadata, system metadata, and embedded metadata.

Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
157
FED. R. EVID. 502.
158
Id. advisory committee’s note.
159
See FED. R. EVID. 502(a). See generally Alabama Aircraft Indus., Inc.-Birmingham v.
United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 757, 772 (2008).
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the privilege that was often caused by such disclosures, Rule 502(a)
provides that, if disclosure of a privileged communication occurs, the
waiver extends to undisclosed communications only if three criteria are
satisfied: 1) the waiver must be intentional; 2) the disclosed and
undisclosed communications concern the same subject matter; and 3) in
fairness, ought to be considered together.160 This will prevent expansive
inadvertent disclosures, while simultaneously preventing attorneys from
abusing the attorney-client privilege: disclosing only favorable
communications and withholding unfavorable communications of the
same subject matter.161
[53] Rule 502(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence deals with the
inadvertent waiver of attorney-client privileged communications.162 A
litigant comes within the scope of the Rule when the disclosure is
inadvertent, reasonable steps were taken to prevent disclosure, and upon
discovery, reasonable steps were promptly taken to address the waiver.163
160

FED. R. EVID. 502(a).
Id.
162
FED. R. EVID. 502(b).
163
Id. The Rule expressly contemplates that this may involve taking the steps set-forth in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(B):
161

If information produced in discovery is subject to a claim of privilege
or of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the claim
may notify any party that received the information of the claim and the
basis for it. After being notified, a party must promptly return,
sequester, or destroy the specified information and any copies it has;
must not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved;
must take reasonable steps to retrieve the information if the party
disclosed it before being notified; and may promptly present the
information to the court under seal for a determination of the claim.
The producing party must preserve the information until the claim is
resolved.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(B). Rule 502(c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that:
When the disclosure is made in a State proceeding and is not the
subject of a State-court order concerning waiver, the disclosure does
not operate as a waiver in a Federal proceeding if the disclosure:
(1) would not be a waiver under this rule if it had been made
in a federal proceeding; or
(2) is not a waiver under the law of
the state where the disclosure occurred.

34

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XV, Issue 3

One of its best features is the uniform effect of a federal court’s ruling that
a waiver has not taken place. In cases pending before a federal court, to
the extent the court determines a waiver has not taken place, that order
stands in any other federal or state proceeding.164
[54] At least two courts have had the opportunity to apply the inadvertent
waiver provisions of Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and early
indications stress that it is essential to conduct defensible methods of
search and review so that a court will find that the litigant’s efforts were
reasonable.165 This is the lynch-pin: if the court finds the review was
careless or not conducted in a reasonable manner, the privilege will be
lost.
[55] In Relion, Inc. v. Hydra Fuel Cell Corp.,166 Relion Inc.’s (“Relion”)
counsel reviewed documents in preparation for production to avoid
providing privileged documents to Hydra Fuel Cell Corp. (“Hydra”).167
Counsel did not identify two privileged e-mails contained within a
production that occupied “over 40 feet of shelf space.”168 Four months
later, Hydra notified Relion of the production, and Relion claimed it was
inadvertent.169 The court was not persuaded, proclaiming, “Relion has not
carried its burden of disproving waiver.”170 Because Relion had the
opportunity to review the files prior to inspection by Hydra, and Hydra
delivered a hard copy and text-searchable copy of those documents
selected for copying, the court concluded that “Relion did not pursue all
reasonable means of preserving the confidentiality of the documents

FED. R. EVID. 502(c).
164
FED. R. EVID. 502(d). Rule 502(e) contemplates that parties can agree that production
of privileged information will not constitute a waiver, but such agreements are binding
only on the parties. The agreement would need to be incorporated into a court order to
have effect beyond the parties. FED. R. EVID. 502(e).
165
See Relion, Inc. v. Hydra Fuel Cell Corp., No. CV06-607-HU, 2008 WL 5122828 (D.
Or. Dec. 4, 2008); Laethem Equip. Co. v. Deere and Co., No. 2:05-CV-10113, 2008 WL
4997932 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 21, 2008).
166
2008 WL 5122828 (2008).
167
Id. at *3.
168
Id. at *2-3.
169
Id. at *3.
170
Id.
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produced to Hydra,” thereby waiving the privilege.171 It is questionable
whether the standard imposed by the court, “all reasonable means,”172 is
actually consistent with the plain language of Rule 502(b), which requires
that only “reasonable steps” be taken to prevent disclosure.173
Nonetheless, litigants can expect, and must be prepared to confront,
differing opinions on what is reasonable; Relion shows that the threshold
will be quite high in some courts.
[56] In Laethem Equip. Co. v. Deere and Co.,174 the court came to the
entirely opposite conclusion than the court in Relion. Plaintiff produced
two discs that contained privileged information and discovered the error
nearly a month later when defendant attempted to use the documents
during a deposition.175 Concluding that the production was inadvertent,
the court explained plaintiff’s review efforts were reasonable, citing the
limited privilege disclosure as compared with the volume of documents
actually produced in the case and the fact that the production took place
outside of the litigant’s “inspect and copy” procedure, which may have
allowed plaintiff to identify the documents.176 Finding that plaintiff also
promptly attempted to rectify the inadvertent production, the court
explained:
Plaintiffs’ counsel first discovered the inadvertent
disclosure at the January 31, 2008, deposition of plaintiffs’
expert Thomas Schwartzenberger. Counsel lodged an
objection based on privilege at that deposition, sent a letter
to defense counsel demanding return of the information on
the same day, and lodged repeated objections and requests
for return at subsequent depositions. And, by February 21,
three weeks after learning of the inadvertent disclosure,
plaintiffs had secured from the Court an order compelling
defendants to return the inadvertently disclosed disks. In

171

Id.
Id.
173
FED. R. EVID. 502(b)(2).
174
2008 WL 4997932 (2008).
175
Id. at *8-9.
176
Id. at *9.
172

36

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XV, Issue 3

these circumstances, plaintiffs diligently attempted to
rectify the inadvertent disclosure.177
[57] Even though Federal Rule of Evidence 502 is helpful in attempting
to create uniformity in the area of privilege waiver and reward litigants for
their reasonable efforts, the two cases above make clear that courts will
closely scrutinize whether a litigant’s efforts were truly reasonable. The
more demonstrable a litigant’s efforts and routine procedures are, and the
more sophisticated its counsel is in the area of e-discovery, the more likely
a court will uphold privilege claims despite production.
2. VICTOR STANLEY V. CREATIVE PIPE178
[58] As Federal Rule of Evidence 502 makes clear, document search and
review methods are inextricably tied to the question of whether
inadvertently produced privileged documents will maintain their status as
privileged.179 Although not decided under Rule 502, Victor Stanley v.
Creative Pipe makes clear that, as technology advances and more
sophisticated methods of document retrieval emerge, demonstrating
“reasonable” efforts may require expert opinion, similar to that which was
required in O’Keefe and Equity Analytics.180 Courts will continue to
reward litigants who proactively address their discovery obligations with
an eye toward defending the methods used.
[59] In Victor Stanley, the parties disputed the scope of defendants’
document production, which the court resolved by requiring the parties to
confer and present a joint protocol for the search and retrieval of ESI (both
parties’ experts were involved in designing the searches).181 The
defendants claimed that a full privilege review of the population of
relevant documents would be unduly burdensome and could not be timely
completed, so defendants proposed a keyword search buttressed by a
177

Id.
250 F.R.D. 251 (D. Md. 2008).
179
FED. R. EVID. 502; Id. at 257.
180
Cf. id (discussing the difficult process of determining whether inadvertent production
of attorney client privileged materials or work-product protected materials constitutes a
waiver); see supra Part IV.B.1-2.
181
Id. at 253-54.
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“clawback agreement” that would prevent inadvertent waiver of the
attorney-client privilege by production of privileged documents.182 When
the court extended the discovery deadline by four months, however, the
defendants abandoned their request for a clawback agreement.183
Defendants and their counsel created a keyword list of seventy keywords
that were to be used to identify potentially privileged documents.184 The
search was conducted and all documents that did not contain the keywords
were produced.185 A large subset of files could not be text searched, but
rather than manually review each document, and citing time constraints,
counsel elected to look at the document titles only, exploring the
document contents further if it appeared that they contained potentially
privileged information.186
The result was the production of 165
purportedly privileged documents, and defendant could not explain from
which document population the documents were inadvertently
produced.187
[60] Finding fault with the methods used to search for and identify
potentially relevant documents, as well as a lack of information from
which the court could determine whether the search was reasonable, the
court explained:
[T]he Defendants are regrettably vague in their description
of the seventy keywords used for the text-searchable ESI
privilege review, how they were developed, how the search
was conducted, and what quality controls were employed to
assess their reliability and accuracy. While it is known that
M. Pappas (a party) and Mohr and Schmid (attorneys)
selected the keywords, nothing is known from the affidavits
provided to the court regarding their qualifications for
designing a search and information retrieval strategy that
could be expected to produce an effective and reliable
privilege review. . . . [A]ll keyword searches are not created
182

Id. at 254-55.
Id. at 255.
184
Id. at 255-56.
185
Id. at 256.
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Id.
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Id.
183
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equal; and there is a growing body of literature that
highlights the risks associated with conducting an
unreliable or inadequate keyword search or relying
exclusively on such searches for privilege review.
Additionally, the Defendants do not assert that any
sampling was done of the text searchable ESI files that
were determined not to contain privileged information on
the basis of the keyword search to see if the search results
were reliable. Common sense suggests that even a properly
designed and executed keyword search may prove to be
over-inclusive or under-inclusive, resulting in the
identification of documents as privileged which are not,
and non-privileged which, in fact, are. The only prudent
way to test the reliability of the keyword search is to
perform some appropriate sampling of the documents
determined to be privileged and those determined not to be
in order to arrive at a comfort level that the categories are
neither over-inclusive nor under-inclusive. There is no
evidence on the record that the Defendants did so in this
case. Rather, it appears from the information that they
provided to the court that they simply turned over to the
Plaintiff all the text-searchable ESI files that were
identified by the keyword search Turner performed as nonprivileged, as well as the non-text searchable files, that
[defense counsel’s] limited title page search determined not
to be privileged.188
Later, the court expanded on this and, relying on Equity Analytics and
O’Keefe, explained:
[T]he Defendants obtained the results of the agreed-upon
ESI search protocol and ran a keyword search on the textsearchable files using approximately seventy keywords
selected by . . . [defendant and counsel]. Defendants, who
bear the burden of proving that their conduct was
reasonable for purposes of assessing whether they waived
188

Id. at 256-57.
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attorney-client privilege by producing the 165 documents
to the Plaintiff, have failed to provide the court with
information regarding: the keywords used; the rationale for
their selection; the qualifications of . . . [defendant and
counsel] to design an effective and reliable search and
information retrieval method; whether the search was a
simple keyword search, or a more sophisticated one, such
as one employing Boolean proximity operators; or whether
they analyzed the results of the search to assess its
reliability, appropriateness for the task, and the quality of
its implementation. While keyword searches have long
been recognized as appropriate and helpful for ESI search
and retrieval, there are well-known limitations and risks
associated with them, and proper selection and
implementation obviously involves technical, if not
scientific knowledge.189
[61] The court stressed that because discovery disputes often require that
the court make factual determinations, it was entirely appropriate for a
court to rely on Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to analyze
whether the selected search method was likely to identify the desired
subset of documents, and that as a finder of fact the court is entitled to
actual facts to decide discovery disputes, rather than the mere
representations that the search was “diligent” or “reasonable.”190 As it
applied to defendant, the court explained:
Selection of the appropriate search and information
retrieval technique requires careful advance planning by
persons qualified to design effective search methodology.
The implementation of the methodology selected should be
tested for quality assurance; and the party selecting the
methodology must be prepared to explain the rationale for
the method chosen to the court, demonstrate that it is
appropriate for the task, and show that it was properly
implemented.191
189

Id. at 259-60.
Id. at 261.
191
Id. at 262.
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[62] To decide whether defendant waived the attorney-client privilege,
the court employed a balancing test that took into consideration: (1) the
reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure;
(2) the number of inadvertent disclosures; (3) the extent of the disclosures;
(4) any delay in measures taken to rectify the disclosure; and (5)
overriding interests in justice.192 The court spent the bulk of its opinion
explaining why defendant’s search and retrieval methods were
unreasonable, pointing consistently to the lack of factual information,
upon which it could find the search reasonable. The court then quickly
dispatched with the remaining factors to find defendant’s production
constituted a privilege waiver.
[63] Victor Stanley underscores the need for large organizations to have
practices and procedures in place that are routinely and consistently
utilized to identify potentially relevant and privileged documents. As
Victor Stanley makes clear, though a lofty and admirable goal, perfection
is not demanded under the Federal Rules. What is required, and rewarded,
are proactive plans to address discovery in a manner calculated to
substantially comply with the Rules.
VI. CONCLUSION
[64] The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and courts interpreting the
Rules or their state counterparts, reward reasonable efforts to comply with
the discovery process. Large organizations should work with outside
counsel to proactively address electronic discovery by designing and
implementing plans, policies, and procedures targeted at capturing,
preserving, and producing relevant information. Without question, such
efforts will not make the organization challenge-proof, but the risk of
sanctions or costly court orders will be greatly reduced.

192

Id. at 259.
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